segunda-feira, 28 de junho de 2010

Segundo trabalho de História da Filosofia Contemporânea I

Olá para todos.
As notas do segundo trabalho de História da Filosofia Contemporânea I já foram lançadas na minhaUFMG.
Os alunos abaixo não entregaram o segundo trabalho.
ANTERO AMANCIO FIUZA GOULART
JOSE LUIS CARVALHO AFONSO
LUIZA SOARES LOPES
MARIA JOSÉ CHAVES DE LIMA
SOFIA NOMAN FILIZZOLA
VITOR AMARAL MEDRADO
WALLISON ALVES BRANDAO

sábado, 26 de junho de 2010

Foucault e Searle - sobre a clareza

I had a friend visiting me who is not famous for clarity, Michel Foucault. [Risos na platéia.] One day I said to him: how can you write so badly? […] He said to me in French: "Look, if I wrote the way you do, as clearly as you do, nobody in Paris would take it seriously. [Risos na platéia.] They would think it is childish to try to write so clearly." Oh come on, you are pulling my leg. And he said: "No. In France you have to have at least ten percent that it is totally incomprehensible."

--John Searle

Postado em 6/5/2010 no blog (muito bom por sinal) problemasfilosoficos.blogspot.com do professor Alexandre Machado da UFPR. 

http://problemasfilosoficos.blogspot.com/2010/05/john-searle-e-michael-foulcaut-sobre.html

quinta-feira, 17 de junho de 2010

Sobre fazedores-de-verdade

Olá para todos. 

Escrevo para lembrar que os seguintes textos sobre fazedores de verdade estão disponíveis

Kevin Mulligan; Peter Simons; Barry Smith - Truth-Makers - 1984

E dois textos meus: 


Abraços

quarta-feira, 9 de junho de 2010

Prova de História da Filosofia Contemporânea I – junho/2010

Olá para todos.
A segunda prova de História da Filosofia Contemporânea I está disponível no link
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/5959592/prova_HFC1_P2.pdf
A prova é individual. O prazo de entrega é 16/06/2010.
Abraços e boa sorte.

Algumas reações ao trabalho de Tarski (de 1960 a 2001)

if 'the Snark was a Boojum' is a sentence of the object language under consideration, we must define 'true'

'The Snark was a Boojum' is true if and only if the Snark was a Boojum.

But what does this tell us? If it tells us anything (and a strong case can be made out for the view that it doesn't), what it dos is to convey the information that the sentences on the left and right of the 'if and only if' are somehow equivalent: that, e.g. anyone who accepts the one is committed to accepting the other. This may be an important fact, if it is a fact, about the usage of 'true', but it is hardly the sort of fact that the correspondence theorist thought that he was pointing out.

Putnam – 'Do true assertions correspond to reality?' in Mind, Language and Reality – Philosophical Papers vol. 3. – 1975 (1960), p. 71.

 

we have been mislead into thinking that Tarski's semantics is semantics by the usual inductive definitions of satisfaction and truth in an interpretation. There it seems that we have something like the world, and denotation, and that we are establishing a relation between sentences and the world. It appears however that this is only a mirage, and the truth is part of the morphology of language.

Tarski's approach through (T) undermines his work on truth both as an attempt to capture the classical conception of truth and as an attempt to formulate a semantic account of truth.

ChateaubriandLogical Forms, 2001, pp. 230, 214.

 

The reason for my uneasiness concerning the notion of truth was, of course, that this notion had been for some time attacked by some philosophers, and with good arguments. It was not so much the antinomy of liar which frightened me, but the difficult of explaining the correspondence theory: what could the correspondence of a statement to the facts be?

Tarski's theory, as all you know, and he stressed first, is a rehabilitation and an elaboration of the classical theory that truth is correspondence to the facts.

PopperObjective Knowledge, 1972 (196?), pp. 320, 323.

 

convention T is expressed in terms of the object language L and the metalanguage ML, but it states something about the relations between language L and the (rest of) the world. This hold even of the example (5) [(5) 'snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white], which is based upon contingent facts about the use of the terms 'snow' and 'white' in English. It is a tautology to state that 'snow' means (the same as) 'snow', but it is a fact of English that 'snow' means snow.

Niiniluoto – Tarskian Truth as Correspondence – Replies to some objections, 1999, p. 97.